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This chapter examines the relationship between legitimate expectations and soft law. In 
what circumstances can an agency’s guidelines create law — or at least legally enforceable 
expectations? At first glance, the answer would appear obvious. The key reason for 
developing soft law is to provide guidance and transparency as to the process (and 
sometimes the substance) of administrative action. Soft law by its nature gives rise to 
expectations. Whether those expectations, in turn, give rise to legal effects is decidedly less 
clear. In fact, this question has vexed Canadian administrative law. Nowhere are questions 
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 1  Soft law is the generally recognised term for offi cial instruments of various forms which 
are non-binding and seek to guide, clarify or affect administrative action. Soft law is most often 
distinguished from  ‘ hard law ’ such as statutes and regulations which are binding and set out 
legally enforceable standards, duties and powers. Another term for guidelines is  ‘ interposed 
law ’ , which Professor William Twining differentiated from  ‘ soft law ’ in his keynote lecture 
at the 2014 Osgoode Forum, 10 May 2014, in Toronto, Ontario. He defi ned interposed law 
as including the  ‘ descriptions of law that tax administrators develop and that come between 
the tax code and the practice of tax administration by administrators ’ . The importance of this 
 ‘ interposed law ’ was highlighted by reference to a hypothetical investor who, in making invest-
ment decisions, would analyse the risks/benefi ts of the investment not only on the  ‘ state law ’ 
but also the very important  ‘ interposed laws ’ that are of practical importance. 
 2  Agraira v Canada [ 2013 ]  2 SCR 559 ( ‘ Agraira ’ ). 
 13 
 Legitimate Expectations in Canada: 
Soft Law and Tax Administration 
 SAS  ANSARI AND  LORNE  SOSSIN 
 THIS CHAPTER EXAMINES the relationship between legitimate expectations and soft law. In what circumstances can an agency ’ s guidelines create law — or at least legally enforceable expectations ? 
At fi rst glance, the answer would appear obvious. The key reason for devel-
oping soft law is to provide guidance and transparency as to the process 
(and sometimes the substance) of administrative action. Soft law by its 
nature gives rise to expectations. Whether those expectations, in turn, give 
rise to legal effects is decidedly less clear. In fact, this question has vexed 
Canadian administrative law. Nowhere are questions of soft law 1 and legiti-
mate expectations more salient than in the context of tax administration. 
 We canvass the relationship between legitimate expectations and soft law 
in the context of Canadian tax administration. The analysis proceeds in 
three parts. In the fi rst part, we consider the important roles of soft law in a 
tax administration system premised on self-assessment. Within this analysis, 
we list and describe six sources of soft law in the tax administration context. 
In the second part, we explore the development of the doctrine of legiti-
mate expectations in Canada, and the implications of the Supreme Court 
of Canada ’ s (SCC) most considered treatment of soft law and legitimate 
expectations in  Agraira v Canada . 2 The third part of the chapter analyses 
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 3  The CRA is properly considered an administrative agency, separate from the Minis-
ter of Revenue. From its start in 1867 as the Department of Customs and the Department 
of Inland Revenue ( The Customs Act 30 – 31 Vict c 6 and  The Inland Revenue Act , 30 – 31 
Vict c 8), the tax administration agency was renamed and reformed a number of times. In 
response to increased criticism of the potential political nature of having taxes administered by 
an elected offi cial, the Government of Canada created a federal agency that, since 2005, has 
been called the Canada Revenue Agency. The CRA is headed by a Commissioner of Revenue 
who is authorised by the Minister of Revenue to exercise the Minister ’ s powers. However, the 
Minister continues to play a role and has (in law) the power to direct the Commissioner to 
exercise any powers, duties, or functions. 
 4  These phrases, referring to the various functions that administrative bodies can perform, 
are taken from the four-part classifi cation in  Ron  Ellis ,  Unjust by Design :  Canada ’ Administra-
tive Justice System ( University of British Colombia Press ,  2013 ) . 
 5  Income Tax Act , RSC 1985 c 1 (5th Supp) at subsection 220(1). 
 6  See eg,  Weaver v The Queen  2008  FCA 238 [11], [18]. 
 7  See eg,  Boulay v The Queen  2003  TCC 96 [7]. 
 8  Canadian courts have repeatedly referred to the  ITA in these terms and have noted that 
many of the  ITA ’ s provisions are  ‘ ambiguous or unclear ’ (see eg,  Canada v Brelco Drilling Ltd , 
[ 1999 ]  4 FC 35 ). The Supreme Court of Canada, in  65302 British Colombia Ltd v Canada 
[ 1999 ]  2 SEC 804 [51], described the  ITA as  ‘ the most detailed, complex, and comprehensive 
statutes in [Canada ’ s] legislative inventory ’ . 
 9  See eg the statements of CRA offi cials in a meeting of tax offi cials outlying the customer 
service approach to tax administration (quoted in  Lorne  Sossin ,  ‘ The Politics of Discretion : 
 Toward a Critical Theory of Public Administration ’ ( 1993 )  36  Canadian Public Administration 
 364, 387 – 88 ). 
 10  Learned  Hand ,  ‘ Eulogy of Thomas Walter Swan ’ ( 1947 )  57  Yale Law Journal  167, 169 . 
Although referring to the US income tax law, the comments are apt when describing most tax 
statutes. 
when (and pursuant to which principles) soft law in the tax administration 
context (eg information circular, interpretation bulletin, or advance judg-
ment) may give rise to a legitimate expectation. 
 We conclude that Canadian administrative law has only begun to grapple 
with legitimate expectations, and that its development in the context of soft 
law represents an important catalyst for sorting out a more coherent and 
transparent framework for the review of administrative action. 
 SOFT LAW AND TAX ADMINISTRATION 
 The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) is a large administrative agency 3 that 
performs various functions, including both  ‘ judicial rights-determining 
functions ’ and  ‘ administrative rights determining functions ’ , 4 in pursuit 
of the administration and enforcement of the  Income Tax Act ( ITA ). 5 The 
 ITA is  ‘ complex ’ 6 and  ‘ convoluted ’ , 7 and is fi lled with provisions that are 
ambiguous and unclear. 8 The CRA recognises the lack of clarity in the  ITA . 9 
The words of Justice Learned Hand are quite appropriate in describing the 
complexity of tax law: 10 
 The words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example, merely dance before 
my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, exception 
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 11  See eg the SCC decision in  Will-Kare Paving  & Contracting Ltd v Canada [ 2000 ]  1 SCR 
915 , where the Court stated that the  ITA does not operate in a vacuum, and that legal char-
acterisation of the broader commercial relationships and law affect the operation and effect 
of the  ITA . 
 12  Canada ,  Report of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation ( Department of 
Finance ,  1998 ) . 
 13  Of course, these professionals do not always agree, inter- and intra-professions, as to the 
meaning and effect of all of the provisions of the  ITA (and other areas of law). 
 14  CRA statistics for the 2013 tax year, available online at  www.cra-arc.gc.ca/gncy/stts/
itsa-sipr/2013/menu-eng.html accessed on 1 March 2016. 
 15  Tax administration using a self-assessment process has been described as  ‘ the ultimate 
delegation of decision making in an income tax system, because it allows the taxpayer to con-
trol to the greatest degree possible the process of determining their tax liability ’ . See  Michael 
 Walpole ,  ‘ Ethics and Integrity in Tax Administration ’ ( 12 September 2009 ) UNSW Law 
Research Paper No 2009-33, 1, available online at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474100 . 
 16  ITA s 161. 
 17  The penalty provisions in the  ITA include: s 162 — failure to fi le annual returns; s 163 —
 false statements and omissions; s 188.1 — penalties for charities; and s 227 — failure to deduct 
and withhold as required. 
upon exception — couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of —
 leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully 
concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within my power, 
if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time. 
 Complexity is increased by tax law ’ s secondary-law nature. 11 Tax law must 
take the legal world (which gives legal signifi cance to real-world events 
and actions, on which tax law then operates) as it fi nds it. Unless the  ITA 
expressly or by necessary implication modifi es the legal terrain, tax law only 
applies after the other laws have exerted their effects. This is a daunting 
task even for seasoned tax lawyers. Not surprisingly, taxpayers often do not 
understand the tax consequences of their choices and life-events. In recogni-
tion of this complexity and the reality of inherent uncertainties in statutory 
interpretation, the Mintz Committee recommended that taxpayers and the 
Minister be allowed to enter into compromise settlements on the basis of 
litigation risk. 12 
 This complexity could be signifi cantly reduced, if not resolved, by apply-
ing professional expertise (lawyers, accountants, etc) 13 but for the fact that, 
in order to function as designed, Canada ’ s income tax system must (at least 
passively) engage with over 26 million individual taxpayers annually. 14 The 
majority of taxpayers have no legal or tax experience or training and cannot 
afford to retain tax experts (nor should they be required to within the con-
text of a self-assessing system). The onus of correctly interpreting the law, 
identifying legally signifi cant facts, and applying the law to these facts —
 coming up with the correct amount of tax owing — is on the taxpayer. 15 
Where the taxpayer fails at this, s/he may face interest charges 16 and (both 
criminal and non-criminal) penalties, 17 possibly exceeding the taxpayer ’ s 
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 18  The  ITA contains complex provisions for penalties that apply in a variety of circum-
stances. For example see  John  Sorensen ,  Michael  Belz and  Shiri  Trop ,  ‘ Non-Criminal Penal-
ties under the Income Tax Act ’ in  2013 Ontario Tax Conference ( Canadian Tax Foundation , 
 2013 ) 12:1. 
 19  Many positions within the CRA require no legal or tax education, eg the CRA ’ s advertise-
ment for a  ‘ Tax Services Agent ’ , whose duties include responding  ‘ to business enquiries related 
to registrations, payroll deductions, GST/HST, self-employment, and corporate income tax ’ , 
are only required to have education that is a  ‘ secondary school diploma ’ or equivalent:  www.
cra-arc.gc.ca careers section, notice accessed 30 July 2014. A copy of the job notice is on fi le 
with the authors. 
 20  Canada Trustco Mortgage Co v Canada  2005  SCC 54 [42]. 
 21  British Colombia Ltd v Canada (n 8) [57]. 
 22  The  ITA in PDF form is 3,236 pages long and the Regulations take up another 1,645 
pages. The text of the four sections dealing with  ‘ Income and Loss from an Offi ce or Employ-
ment ’ , the simplest of the provisions in the  ITA , covers 50 of those pages. The CRA has issued 
a number of guidelines to deal with these four sections, totaling another 50 pages of explana-
tions covering only small portions of those four sections. These four sections do not cover other 
sources of income, investment income, excluded amounts, deductions, credits, or other matters 
commonly encountered by most taxpayers. 
 23  See Ellis (n 4) 135 where such functions are said to be performed by the  ‘ policy and legis-
lative department ’ of the  ‘ portfolio ministry ’ of the executive branch of government. 
 24  The fi rst such publication by Canada Revenue (as it then was) was in 1970, and consisted 
of two series of publications:  ‘ Information Circulars ’ and  ‘ Interpretation Bulletins ’ . 
 25  The TCC in  Dunlap v The Queen  52  DTC 2053 , held that the  ‘ principal purpose of the 
bulletins is to inform the public of policies which the [Minister] has adopted for the administra-
tion of legislation as broad and complex as the  Income Tax Act ’ . 
tax liability. 18 CRA employees who judge and analyse taxpayers ’ tax returns 
are faced with the same lack of certainty and clarity in interpreting and 
applying the complex and convoluted provisions of the  ITA , often with little 
more expertise and education than most taxpayers. 19 
 One policy of tax legislation is the creation of tax law that is  ‘ certain, 
predictable and fair, so that taxpayers can intelligently order their affairs ’ . 20 
Meeting this policy goal in a  ‘ self-assessment system, which requires indi-
viduals without legal training to work through a complex series of provi-
sions [ … ] for which maximum guidance is necessary ’ 21 is in part achieved 
through the creation and distribution of detailed guidelines. 22 The CRA, 
in order to serve its various functions,  ‘ distills from the statutory text the 
particulars of the legislator ’ s policy intentions, and drafts and  “ enacts ” the 
directive and the rules and regulations necessary to give effect to those par-
ticulars ’ . 23 These agency-created documents, referred herein collectively as 
 ‘ guidelines ’ , are the focus of this chapter. 24 
 This soft law is used in the course of giving effect to the statutory rights 
granted and obligations imposed by the  ITA . 25 They guide the decisions 
of various CRA employees involved in determining the existence of and 
the outcome of disputes between taxpayers and the state that arise in the 
ordinary course of administrating the  ITA . They are also heavily employed 
by lawyers and tax professionals in providing services to taxpayers, and are 
used by taxpayers themselves to make sense of the Canadian income tax 
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 26  Michael Walpole,  ‘ Ethics and Integrity in Tax Administration ’ in Surviving Challenges, 
Seizing Opportunities, Inland Revenue Board Malaysia, Malaysia, presented at National Tax 
Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 4 – 5 August 2009 at p 10, available online at  http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1474100 . 
 27  Vito  Tanzi and  Parthasarathi  Shome ,  ‘ A Primer on Tax Evasion ’ ( Dec ,  1993 ) 40:4 Staff 
Papers — International Monetary Fund 807, 810. 
 28  Ibid, 819. See also  James  Alm ,  Isabel  Sanchez , and  Ana  de Juan ,  Economic and Noneco-
nomic Factors in Tax Compliance ( Blackwell Publishing ,  1995 ) Vol  48 ( 1 ),  3 – 18 . 
 29  Robert  Halperin and  Joseph  Tzur ,  ‘ Tax Evasion and the Low Penalty, Low Audit Rate 
Phenomenon ’ ( 1990 )  9  Journal of Accounting and Public Policy  179, 179 . 
 30  Michael  Walpole ,  ‘ Ethics and Integrity in Tax Administration ’ ( 12 September 2009 ) 
UNSW Law Research Paper No 2009 – 33 at pp 12 – 13, available online at  http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1474100 . See also  Soren  Sch ø nberg ,  Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law 
( Oxford University Press ,  2000 ) . 
 31  Walpole (n 30) 13. 
 32  For example, in the Federal Court of Appeal in  Hawkes v The Queen [ 1997 ]  2 CTC 133 
(FCA) [7], Strayer JA observed that tax administrators must avoid conduct that damages the 
perception of the  ‘ system as fair, equitable, and reasonable in application ’ . 
 33  See Sch ø nberg (n 30) 9. 
 34  In the income tax context, discretion may be discretion expressly granted by the  ITA , 
may be implied in the implementation of public polices, may materialise in the interpretation 
given to unclear or ambiguous provisions, or may be implicit in the everyday interactions of tax 
administrators with taxpayers. See  Lorne  Sossin ,  ‘ The Politics of Discretion ’ ( 1993 )  Canadian 
Public Administration  36:3, 364, 384 . 
system. This is why soft law plays as crucial a role in the smooth functioning 
of a self-assessment system, the exercise of discretion by CRA offi cials, and 
the compliance efforts of taxpayers. 
 Guidelines and the Integrity of the Tax System 
 Canada ’ s self-assessment system relieves the tax authority of the duties 
normally imposed on assessors freeing up resources for administration 
and enforcement. 26 This is not without cost. A self-assessment system pro-
vides greater opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion, undermining the 
tax base and reducing government revenues. 27 Tax avoidance and evasion 
increase where,  inter alia , 28 , 29 the tax system is perceived as being unfair. 30 
In a self-assessment system,  ‘ fairness and even handedness by the tax author-
ity are required to encourage integrity among taxpayers ’ , and perceptions of 
unfair treatment by the tax authority have an  ‘ important infl uence on future 
levels of tax evasion ’ . 31 
 The importance of taxpayer trust within a self-assessment system, and the 
effects of perceptions of fairness, is well recognised by the Canadian Gov-
ernment and courts. 32 In an increasingly complex and changing legal land-
scape, actors ought to be able to rely on law with some certainty. 33 Where 
the law involves administrative discretion, 34 is complex, or is otherwise 
uncertain, the public will have diffi culty in predicting how discretion will 
298 Sas Ansari and Lorne Sossin
 35  See Sch ø nberg (n 30) 14. 
 36  Sch ø nberg (n 30) 29. Sch ø nberg saw this as fundamental to the Rule of Law (at 13). 
 37  See  Revenue  Canada ,  Ensuring Fair Customs and Revenue Administration in Canada : 
 A Discussion Paper on Progress and Innovation to Comment ( Revenue Canada ,  1998 ) at 
foreword. 
 38  A  Meghji and  S  Sieker ,  ‘ A Contest of Unequals :  Recent Developments in Tax Litigation ’ 
in  Report of the Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Tax Conference ,  1997 Tax Conference ( Cana-
dian Tax Foundation ,  1998 ) 11:1, 11:22. 
 39  See  Benjamin  Alarie ,  Kalmen  Datt ,  Adrian  Sawyer and  Greg  Weeks ,  ‘ Advance Tax Rul-
ings in Perspective :  A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis ’ ( 2014 )  21  New Zealand Journal 
of Taxation Law and Policy  362 ;  Woon v MNR [ 1950 ]   CTC 263 (Ex Ct) . 
 40  These documents are obtained and made publicly available by private entities though 
freedom of information requests. 
be exercised or the law will be interpreted and applied. 35 Clearly worded 
and easy to understand representations by public authorities will, in cases 
of ambiguity, serve to guide an individual ’ s actions and decisions. 36 There-
fore, how the law treats soft law may undermine taxpayers ’ perceptions of 
fairness. 37 For example, the failure of courts to allow into evidence such 
things as government policy concerning the application of certain rules of 
evidence of the treatment of similar taxpayers is seen as having a negative 
effect. 38 
 Soft Law and Tax 
 There are a large number of tax guidelines that could be considered for 
the purposes of this analysis. The authority for developing soft law is not 
expressly found in the  ITA , but is implied by provisions empowering the 
Minister to administer the  ITA . A small subset of these sources of soft law 
includes: 
(i)  Income Tax Folios ( ‘ ITF ’ ); 
(ii)  Income Tax Information Circulars ( ‘ IC ’ ); 
(iii)  Income Tax Interpretation Bulletins ( ‘ IT ’ ); 
(iv)  Income Tax Technical News ( ‘ ITTN ’ ); 
(v)  Tax Guides and Pamphlets; and 
(vi)  Advanced Income Tax Rulings ( ‘ ATR ’ ). 39 
 There are other publications that are publicly available even if designed for 
use by expert specialists rather than members of the public. This category 
includes the CRA Appeals Manual, and other statements and communi-
cations by the CRA (both written and oral, and formal and informal). 40 
Relevant statements and publications could also include those made by 
the Department of Finance (for example comfort letters, news releases, tax 
bulletins, technical papers). 
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 41  Guides are often accompanied with forms and directions on how to fi ll out and fi le those 
forms. 
 42  ITFs state that they are updated when interpretations change or major developments 
occur, leading a reader to trust that the information is current. ITFs also expressly state that 
the folio chapters can be relied upon as an accurate summary of the CRA ’ s interpretation of the 
law — see for example the fi rst paragraph in the Medical Expense Tax Credit Folio — S1-F1-C1, 
available online at  www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/tchncl/ncmtx/fl s/s1/f1/s1-f1-c1-eng.html . 
 43  See for example paragraphs 3 to 5 in IC12-1,  ‘ GST/HST Compliance Refund Holds ’ , 
available online at  www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/ic12-1/ic12-1-12e.pdf ; IC00-1R4 [7]. 
 Of the above, ITFs and ICs are intended for use by both taxpayers and 
tax professionals, ITTNs and ITs are intended for tax professionals, Tax 
Guides and Pamphlets are intended for taxpayers and the general public, 41 
and ATRs are applicable to specifi c transactions. Despite the distinction in 
use, all of them are written in clear language and appear easy to understand/
apply by taxpayers without recourse to tax professionals. ITFs, 42 ITTNs, 
and ITs are subject to general notices that appear to be aimed at limiting the 
reasonableness of replying on the information they contain, often referring 
the reader back to the ITA, Regulations, and relevant cases. ICs are not sub-
ject to a general notice, though specifi c ICs contain statements as to when 
they do and do not apply, including that they are not meant to replace the 
spirit or intent of legislation. 43 Tax Guides and Pamphlets and ATRs do not 
contain any notices, but ATRs are issued to taxpayers and are considered by 
the CRA to be binding only for that one taxpayer and only within the facts 
detailed. Despite the various notices, the wording of which is different in the 
various soft-law instruments, given the complexity of income tax law and 
the vast volume of  ‘ incomprehensible ’ text in the statute and regulations, 
we would suggest that reliance may be necessarily invited by the simple act 
of making available more accessible and understandable descriptions of the 
law. 
 In light of the range of sources of soft law in the context of tax adminis-
tration, discussed above, how should the legal effects of these instruments 
be understood ? Are instruments intended for use by tax professionals to be 
considered as giving rise to greater/lesser expectation than those intended 
for taxpayers ? Are instruments which are not publicly circulated (but which 
are not secret either) be considered to create greater/lesser expectation than 
those posted on the CRA website ? Given the disclaimers that routinely 
accompany all these instruments, to the effect that none of them  ‘ replace the 
law ’ , should they give rise to legal consequences ? Is a taxpayer who relies on 
the content of these instruments to his/her detriment within his/her rights to 
seek a remedy on the basis an expectation has been frustrated ? 
 In order to answer these fundamental questions, it is necessary review the 
treatment of legitimate expectation in Canadian administrative law. 
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 44  See  F  Houle and  L  Sossin ,  ‘ Tribunals and Guidelines :  Exploring the Relationships 
between Fairness and Legitimacy in Administrative Decision-Making ’ ( 2006 )  46  Canadian 
Public Administration  283 . 
 45  For a notable exception, see  David  Wright ,  ‘ Rethinking the Doctrine of Legitimate Expec-
tations in Canadian Administrative Law ’ ( 1997 )  35  Osgoode Hall Law Journal  139 . For an 
example of a more systematic approach in the UK setting, see  Adam  Perry and  Farrah  Ahmed , 
 ‘ The Coherence of the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations ’ ( 2014 )  73  Cambridge Law 
Journal  61 . 
 LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND SOFT LAW 
 Soft law can be described both by what it is and what it is not. 44 In the 
fi rst (descriptive) sense, soft law includes a wide range of instruments, from 
guidelines to circulars, policy statements to protocols, which infl uence a 
decision-making process. All of the CRA guidelines outlined above qualify 
as soft law (at least on this standard). In the second (legal) sense, soft law 
refers to any rules which affect decision-making but are by design or defi -
nition non-binding, and so not  ‘ law ’ . In the Canadian context,  ‘ hard law ’ 
would represent all statutory provisions and rules emanating from instru-
ments delegated by statutes to be binding (eg regulations, by-laws, etc). 
Hard law, in other words, is what authorises CRA offi cials, on behalf of the 
Minister, to make decisions. Soft law represents everything else that shapes 
the resulting exercise of the discretion created by hard law. 
 Because the CRA itself promulgates the guidelines discussed above, is it 
reasonable for taxpayers and tax preparers to expect the CRA to rely and 
make decisions based on their contents ? This question is not as straightfor-
ward as it sounds. The guidelines themselves make apparent that they are 
not intended to replace the law. How can offi cials be held accountable for 
applying or not applying non-binding instruments ? However, it appears to 
be unfair for those interacting with CRA offi cials to be given information 
about how the CRA will interpret and apply the  ITA if those offi cials can 
disregard the information at any time for any reason. Further, the CRA does 
not treat these different instruments alike. While ITTNs are simply informa-
tional, the ITs are clearly intended to disclose how certain matters are likely 
to be approached by the CRA. ITFs appear to be hybrid instruments which 
inform and advise. Tax administration needs a spectrum of legal relevance 
rather than an on/off switch that would simply create or not create legally 
relevant expectations. 
 Legitimate Expectations and the Supreme Court of Canada 
 Canada lacks a detailed conceptual framework for the application of 
 legitimate expectations. 45 The very fi rst detailed discussion of legitimate 
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 46  Martineau v Matsqui Disciplinary Bd [ 1980 ]  1 SCR 603 ( ‘ Martineau ’ ). 
 47  Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [ 1969 ]  2 Ch 149 (CA) . 
 48  Martineau (n 46) 627. 
 49  Martineau (n 46) 628 – 29. 
 50  Martineau (n 46) 628. 
 51  Martineau (n 46) 630. 
 52  Old St Boniface Residents Assn Inc v Winnipeg (City) [ 1990 ]  3 SCR 1170 ( ‘ Old 
St Boniface ’ ). 
 53  Ibid, 1203. 
 54  Ibid, 1204. 
expectations by the SCC took place in  Martineau in the context of soft 
law. 46 In that decision, the majority of the Court provided a closer analysis 
of the duty to act fairly based on the English fairness doctrine. An inmate 
in a federal penitentiary challenged a conviction for a disciplinary offence 
relying in part on departures from a Commissioner ’ s Directive providing 
procedural safeguards/rights. The majority referred to Lord Denning ’ s deci-
sion in  Schmidt , 47 where the doctrine of legitimate expectations was fi rst 
introduced in English law. 
 In discussing the role and effect of  ‘ fairness ’ , the majority stated that 
 ‘ natural justice and fairness are principles of judicial process deemed by the 
common law to be annexed to legislation, with a view to bringing statutory 
provisions in conformity with the common law requirements of justice ’ . 48 
The majority held that, between the poles of  ‘ purely ministerial decisions ’ 
on board policy grounds that attract no procedural protection and judicial-
like functions that attract substantial procedural safeguards, 49 there exists 
 ‘ a myriad decision-making processes with a fl exible gradation of procedural 
fairness through the administrative spectrum ’ . 50 Dealing specifi cally with 
the application of the Commissioner ’ s Directives, the majority stated that 
the courts are not concerned with: 
 breaches of the prison rules, but whether there has been a breach of the duty 
to act fairly in all circumstances,  … the rules are of some importance in deter-
mining [the question of fairness] as [they are] an indication of the views of the 
prison authorities as to the degree of procedural protection to be extended to 
inmates. 51 
 The Court attempted to bring together Canadian and English principles 
in  Old St Boniface , 52 a case arising in the disparate setting of municipal 
re-zoning. The majority discussed the appellant ’ s argument based on  ‘ a 
legitimate expectation of consultation ’ created by the  ‘ conduct of the 
 Committee ’ . 53 The majority stated that the English principle merely extends 
the reach of the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness to give  ‘ a 
party affected by the decision of a public offi cial an opportunity to make 
representations in circumstances in which there otherwise would be no such 
opportunity ’ . 54 Legitimate expectation was grounded in the  ‘ conduct of a 
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 55  Ibid. 
 56  Genevi è ve  Cartier ,  ‘ A  “ Mullanian ” Approach to the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations : 
 Real Questions and Promising Answers ’ in  Grant  Huscroft ,  Michael  Taggart , and  David  J 
 Mullan (eds),  Inside and Outside Canadian Administrative Law :  Essays in Honour of David 
Mullan ( University of Toronto Press ,  2006 )  189 – 90 . 
 57  Wright (n 45) 167. 
 58  Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (BC) [ 1991 ]  2 SCR 525 ( ‘ CAP ’ ). 
 59  Ibid. 
 60  Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [ 1999 ]  2 SCR 817 ( ‘ Baker ’ ). 
public offi cial [that lead] a party [ … ] to believe that his or her rights would 
not be affected without consultation ’ . 55 The majority concluded that, even 
if there was a legitimate expectation, it would not replace the elaborate 
statutory scheme with another process of consultation. Some commentators 
believe that this decision excluded the possibility of substantive legitimate 
expectations in Canada, 56 while others believe that it left that possibility 
open. 57 
 The SCC in  Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (BC) ( CAP ) appeared 
to resolve the ambiguity regarding legitimate expectations created by  Old 
St Boniface . 58 This was an appeal from a British Colombia Court of Appeal 
decision that extended the reach of the legitimate expectations doctrine 
by restricting the Federal Government Executive ’ s ability to introduce a 
Bill into Parliament (aimed at reducing a budget defi cit) in breach of an 
agreement between the Federal and Provincial Governments. The Supreme 
Court found that the Government had abided by the agreement and, since 
the agreement ’ s funding formula referred to the statute, it could be validly 
amended by statute. In dealing with the doctrine of legitimate expectations, 
the Court referred to  Old St Boniface , and then drew a distinction between 
the procedural right to be consulted and the substantive right to give con-
sent. The Court concluded that the creation of substantive rights through 
the doctrine of legitimate expectations is not supported in Canadian or 
English cases. The doctrine was said to be part of the rules of procedural 
fairness, and where it is applicable, it can create additional rights to make 
representations or to be consulted. The Court concluded that legitimate 
expectations could not operate to fetter the decision following the repre-
sentation or consultation. Further, the rules of procedural fairness do not 
bind a body  ‘ exercising purely legislative functions ’ . 59 In other words, one 
government could not bind future governments by making promises about 
legislation or policy. 
 In  Baker , 60 the Court attempted to embed legitimate expectations in the 
broader duty of fairness and invoked it as one of fi ve non-exhaustive and 
non-hierarchal  ‘ factors ’ a court should consider in determining the degree 
of fairness owed in a particular context. The Court addressed legitimate 
expectations in the context of soft law in this analysis and held that the 
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failure of the decision-maker to follow the applicable guideline or applica-
ble international covenants and agreements did not render the exercise of 
discretion unfair. 61 
 The Court dealt with the legal effect of the publicly available guidelines. 
Here, the Immigration Manual used by immigration offi cers provided vari-
ous criteria and considerations to be assessed in exercising their discretion. 
In  obiter , the Court outlined the doctrine for purposes of determining the 
content of the duty of fairness. After confi rming that a legitimate expecta-
tion  ‘ does not create substantive rights ’ , 62 and distinguishing the  ‘ object of 
the expectation from its legal effects ’ , 63 the Court stated that: 
 a legitimate expectation that a certain procedure will be followed [means that] this 
procedure will be required by the duty of fairness  … [and] a legitimate expectation 
that a certain result will be reached [ … ] may require more extensive procedural 
rights than would otherwise be accorded. 64 
 The Court clarifi ed that the doctrine is based on the principle that  ‘ it will 
generally be unfair for [administrative decision-makers] to act in contra-
vention of representations as to procedure, or to backtrack on substantive 
promises without according signifi cant procedural rights ’ . 65 
 For the Court in  Baker , the guidelines related more to the substantive 
review of the reasonableness of the Immigration Offi cer ’ s exercise of dis-
cretion. The Court held that  ‘ the guidelines are a useful indicator of what 
constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the power conferred by the pro-
vision, and the fact that this decision was contrary to the directives is of 
great help in assessing whether the decision was an unreasonable exercise ’ 
of discretion. 66 Even the discretion to make a decision that is wholly a mat-
ter of judgment is granted within certain boundaries. Such a decision must 
be made  ‘ following an approach that respects [the purpose of the discretion 
and the values it advances] ’ . 67 In this case, the guidelines refl ected the proper 
approach (which also incorporated the approach set out in an international 
convention to which Canada was a signatory) and the decision ’ s inconsist-
ency with the guideline and the international convention led to the conclu-
sion that the decision was unreasonable. 
 Subsequently, the Court explored whether a fi nding of unreasonableness 
could fl ow from promissory estoppel if a promise by a decision-maker gives 
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 68  Mount Sinai Hospital Centre v Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services)  2001 
 SCC 41 ( ‘ Mount Sinai ’ ). 
 69  Ibid, [90]. 
 70  Ibid, [100]. 
 71  Ibid, [66]. 
 72  Ibid, [8]. 
 73  Ibid, [16]. 
 74  The minority referred to a  ‘ patently unreasonable ’ decision, but this standard was later 
fused with the  ‘ reasonable ’ standard in  Dunsmuir v New Brunswick  2008  SCC 9 [45]. 
 75  Mount Sinai (n 68) [16]. 
 76  Relying on a number of international and Canadian decisions:  Sous-ministre du Revenu 
du Qu é bec v Transport Lessard (1976) Lt é e [ 1985 ]  RDJ 502 ;  Gingras v Canada [ 1990 ]  2 FC 
68 (TD) , and  Bloomfi eld v Saskatchewan (Minister of Health) [ 1986 ]  SJ No 675 (QL) (QB) . 
 77  Mount Sinai (n 68) [24]. 
rise to detrimental reliance. In  Mount Sinai , 68 a government offi cial com-
mitted to a process resulting in the relocation of a hospital and then reneged 
on its approval for the relocation. The majority of the SCC held that it was 
unnecessary to decide whether a legitimate expectation was created by the 
Government ’ s representations, and allowed the appeal based upon its inter-
pretation of the applicable statute. Writing for the majority of the Court, 
Bastarache J held that the Minister was bound by the prior commitment 
as the initial exercise of the relevant discretion. 69 At that point, the Court 
held the discretion was, in effect, exhausted, and the subsequent attempt to 
reverse the decision on the relocation was not authorised and not valid. 70 
 Binnie J, in a concurring decision with which McLachlin CJ agreed, con-
cluded that the Minister ’ s decision was  ‘ patently unreasonable [ … and] 
reached by a process that was demonstrably unfair ’ and, therefore, an abuse 
of discretion. 71 The respondents were found to have worked closely with 
the regulators for a long time, developing a  ‘ web of understandings and 
incremental arrangements with the concurrence indeed the encouragement 
of successive Ministers ’ . 72 Binnie J concluded that, where representations 
are detrimentally relied upon, an estoppel will operate unless a statute or 
an overriding public interest dictates a contrary result. 73 Alternatively, an 
unreasonable 74 decision may be quashed and, absent an overriding public 
interest to the contrary, mandamus might then issue to compel the decision-
maker to exercise his or her discretion afresh and according to law. 75 
 The minority addressed the respondent ’ s argument that legitimate expec-
tations can give substantive results where the result is not contrary to law 
and is otherwise within the power of the Minister. While the respondent 
argued that the doctrine was evolving, 76 the minority noted that there is a 
difference between the Canadian and English contexts. In England, it was 
stated that the doctrine of legitimate expectations  ‘ performs a number of 
functions that in Canada are kept distinct ’ . 77 The doctrine of legitimate 
expectations in England was seen as having developed into 
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 79  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
 80  Mount Sinai (n 68) [29]. 
 81  Mount Sinai (n 68) [30]. Note, however, that in  Coughlan , Lord Woolf implied that 
reliance may be a necessary element; see  R v North and East Devon Health Authority: 
ex parte Coughlan [ 2001 ]  1 QB 213 . Note also that in  Minister for Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs v Teoh [ 1995 ]  HCA 20 , the High Court of Australia held that actual reliance was 
unnecessary. 
 82  Mount Sinai (n 68) [30], citing with approval  SA  de Smith ,  H  Woolf and  J  Jowell ,  Judi-
cial Review of Administrative Action ,  5th edn ( Sweet and Maxwell ,  1995 )  417 . The editors 
state that adding estoppel-type requirements to legitimate expectations would  ‘ involve unfair 
discrimination between those who were and were not aware of the representation and would 
benefi t the well-informed or well-advised [and] would also encourage undesirable adminis-
trative practice by too readily relieving decision-makers of the normal consequences of their 
actions ’ (at 426). 
 83  Mount Sinai (n 68) [32]. 
 84  An attack on such decisions must be based on abuse of discretion: Mount Sinai (n 68), 
[33] .
 85  Mount Sinai (n 68) [34]. 
 a comprehensive code that embraced the full gamut of administrative relief from 
procedural fairness at the low end through  ‘ enhanced ’ procedural fairness based 
on conduct, thence onwards to estoppel (though it is not to be called that) includ-
ing substantive relief at the high end. 78 
 The high end of relief was seen as an inappropriate intervention in govern-
ment policy in Canada, absent a challenge under the  Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms . 79 
 The minority stated that the doctrine of legitimate expectations looks to 
the public authority ’ s clear, unambiguous, and unqualifi ed conduct in exer-
cising power, and requires that the expectation does not confl ict with the 
authority ’ s statutory jurisdiction. 80 Unlike estoppel, legitimate expectations 
do not require the person to show awareness of, reliance on, or detriment 
resulting from the relied on conduct. 81 This is because the focus of legitimate 
expectations is the promotion of  ‘ regularity, predictability, and certainty in 
government ’ s dealing with the public ’ . 82 The minority felt that the decision 
in  CAP , referring to  Old St Boniface , closed the door on substantive relief, 
but also stated that if  ‘ the Court is to give substantive relief, more demand-
ing conditions precedent must be fulfi lled than are presently required by the 
doctrine of legitimate expectation ’ . 83 
 One limitation on the legitimate expectations doctrine is that purely min-
isterial decisions on broad grounds of public policy will not typically afford 
any procedural protections. 84 Another limitation is that a public body exer-
cising legislative functions is only liable to judicial supervision as a result of 
a successful  Charter challenge. 85 
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 87  Moreau-B é rub é v New Brunswick (Judicial Council)  2002  SCC 11 ( ‘ Moreau ’ ). 
 88  Ibid, [78]. 
 89  Ibid. 
 90  Mackin v New Brunswick (Minister of Finance)  2002  SCC 13 ( ‘ Mackin ’ ). 
 91  Ibid, [162]. 
 92  CUPE v Ontario (Minister of Labour)  2003  SCC 29 ( ‘ CUPE ’ ). 
 93  Ibid, [110]. 
 94  Ibid, [133]. 
 95  Ibid, [131]. 
 Legitimate expectations have also sometimes been labelled to emphasise 
 ‘ reasonableness ’ rather than  ‘ legitimacy ’ . 86 In  Moreau, 87 for example, it was 
argued that the applicant had a  ‘ reasonable expectation ’ that inquiry fi nd-
ings into her conduct as a judge would not result in her dismissal and that 
she would continue in her role after the impugned action. There is nothing 
in the facts relied on to locate the basis of these  ‘ reasonable expectations ’ 
in  ‘ clear, unambiguous, and unqualifi ed ’ representations or conduct of the 
decision-maker. The SCC did not inquire whether there were any legiti-
mate expectations on the basis of which relief was sought, but simply held 
that  ‘ the doctrine of reasonable expectations does not create substantive 
rights, and does not fetter the discretion of a statutory decision-maker ’ . 88 
The doctrine was stated only to create and apply to procedural rights, and 
then only when  ‘ a party affected by an administrative decision can establish 
a legitimate expectation that a certain procedure would be followed ’ . 89 
 A number of SCC decisions refer to the doctrine of legitimate expecta-
tions in passing. In  Mackin , 90 dealing with the status of supernumerary 
judges, the Court did not fi nd that a legitimate expectation had been estab-
lished, but went on to note that even if one had, the doctrine does not apply 
to purely legislative functions and does not  ‘ operate to entitle the [person] 
to a substantive as opposed to procedural remedy ’ . 91 
 In  CUPE , 92 the Court was called upon to determine what factors were 
relevant and irrelevant to a particular exercise of discretion by the Minister 
of Labour to appoint interest arbitrators, and looked to the history of the 
legislation to identify its purpose. 93 The majority held that  ‘ the conditions 
precedent to the application of the doctrine [of legitimate expectations] 
were not established in this case ’ 94 but nonetheless commented on the reach 
of the doctrine. The majority described legitimate expectations as  ‘ an exten-
sion of the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness ’ that considers the 
conduct of an administrative decision-maker in the exercise of a discretion-
ary power including  ‘ established practices, conduct or representations ’ that 
can be characterised as clear and has in fact produced reasonable expecta-
tions of procedure or a certain benefi t. 95 The question of  ‘ legitimacy ’ arises 
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 102  See  Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)  2015  SCC 61 , where the 
majority of the Court reiterated that guidelines, though useful, are not legally binding and are 
not intended to be exhaustive or restrictive. The Court concluded that a discretionary decision-
maker who limited the criteria to be considered only to those set out in the Ministry guidelines 
acted unreasonably. 
 103  The issues related to the doctrine of legitimate expectations were considered to be inci-
dental to the central issue of whether the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) chose the correct 
standard of review and applied it properly:  Agraira [ 2013 ]  2 SCR 559 [3], [47]. 
 104  Relief could be granted where the person  ‘ satisfi es the Minister that their presence in 
Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest ’ : ibid [42]. 
 105  Ibid, [2]. 
when looking to whether or not the expectations confl ict with a statutory 
duty. 96 In the result, the majority characterised past practices in the appoint-
ment of arbitrators as an implied requirement of the appointment power 
and the Minister, by failing to adhere to those practices, reached a patently 
unreasonable decision. 
 In  Mavi , 97 the SCC considered the decision of Ontario to adopt certain 
procedures in light of federal statutory requirements, including whether 
Ontario had behaved reasonably or had fettered its discretion. The Court 
held that the legislation left Ontario with a measure of discretion, and 
that the procedure adopted by Ontario was compatible with the statute 98 
without confl icting with the intended scope of the discretion. 99 The impor-
tance of policy as a guide to civil servants was recognised by the Court, as 
was the Minister ’ s entitlement to set policy within legal limits. 100 The Court 
stated that, in order to give rise to legitimate expectations, representations 
have to be within the scope of the decision-maker ’ s authority. Reliance was 
held not to be required. 101 
 The most recent 102 and most potentially far-reaching discussion of legiti-
mate expectations by the SCC is that in  Agraira , 103 which relates specifi -
cally to soft law. This unanimous judgment of a seven-member Court was 
concerned with a Minister ’ s discretionary decision, required to be exercised 
after considering the  ‘ national interest ’ . 104 The appellant argued that the 
Minister took an excessively narrow view of the phrase  ‘ national interest ’ , 
and failed to meet a legitimate expectation that certain procedures would be 
followed and certain factors taken into account. 105 
 While a staff briefi ng note indicated the petition should be granted, the 
Minister denied relief. The lower court had held that the Minister ’ s reasons 
did not address the questions listed in the guidelines or factors identifi ed by 
the courts as relevant. The SCC considered the reasonableness of the Min-
ister ’ s decision and referred to the guidelines as part of the  reasonableness 
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 106  Guidelines can serve at least two distinct purposes. One is to inform the reasonableness 
analysis of a discretionary decision; the other is to determine whether the process was fair 
or not. Here, the broader context of the statutory provision  ‘ includes the Guidelines ’ which, 
although not law  ‘ in the strict sense ’ , are  ‘ a useful indicator of what constitutes a reasonable 
interpretation ’ of the particular provision: ibid [85]. 
 107  Agraira (n 103) [60]. 
 108  Agraira (n 103) [60]. 
 109  Agraira (n 103) [94]. 
 110  Agraira (n 103) [97]. 
 111  Agraira (n 103) [98]. 
 112  Agraira (n 103) [101]. 
 113  As at 1 January 2016,  Agraira had been cited in over 300 cases. 
 114  The majority of the decisions cited  Agraira when dealing with (i) standard of review 
analysis, (ii) reasonableness of decisions, (iii) suffi ciency of reasons, (iv) humanitarian and 
compassionate ground considerations under  Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , (v) pre-
sumptions of consistent expression in statutes and modern rule of statutory interpretation, or 
(vi) a court of appeal ’ s role when reviewing JR decision of lower court. 
 115  Frankie ’ s Burgers Lougheed Inc v Canada (Employment and Social Development)  2015 
 FC 27 ( ‘ Frankie ’ s ’ ) and  Pushparasa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)  2015  FC 828 
( ‘ Pushparasa ’ ). 
assessment. 106 The Court stated that, rather than being a fi xed code, the 
guidelines contained  ‘ a set of factors, which appeared to be relevant and 
reasonable ’ for the exercise of the particular discretion. 107 The Minister was 
not required to apply them formulaically, but they should have  ‘ guided the 
exercise of his discretion and assisted in framing a fair administrative pro-
cess for such applications ’ and, as such, assisted the Court in understanding 
the Minister ’ s  ‘ implied interpretation of the  “ national interest ” ’ . 108 
 The doctrine of legitimate expectations was stated to be a  ‘ particular 
face of procedural fairness ’ that can work to expand the procedural pro-
tections otherwise available. 109 Legitimate expectations cannot give rise to 
substantive rights; courts are limited to granting only procedural relief. 110 In 
 Agraira , the Court held that the guidelines, which were publicly available, 
met the threshold requirements to give rise to a legitimate expectation. 111 
The Court stated that in this case the expectation was fulfi lled. 112 With 
regard to relevant factors outlined in the guidelines, the Court was of the 
opinion that where the guideline (irrespective of its source) is employed by 
the decision-maker in the making of the decision or in obtaining guidance 
for the exercise of discretion, and where the guideline is a relatively compre-
hensive code with respect to the decision of the exercise of discretion, then 
the factors listed must be considered. 
 Agraira has been infl uential in Canadian courts, 113 though only a handful 
of decisions have relied on it to resolve matters related to legitimate expec-
tations and the (mis)use of guidelines by administrative decision-makers. 114 
Of these decisions, only two have considered the substantive effect that 
guidelines can have when reviewing the reasonableness of an administrative 
decision-maker ’ s exercise of discretion. 115 In  Pushparasa , the Federal Court 
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 Baker (n 60); and  Mount Sinai (n 68). 
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 121  Baker (n 60);  Agraira (n 103). 
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 123  Mount Sinai (n 68) (Binnie J);  Moreau (n 87);  CUPE (n 92). 
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 125  Agraira (n 103). 
 126  Mavi (n 97). 
 127  Mount Sinai (n 68) (Binnie J); and  Mavi (n 97). 
(FC) stated that guidelines are useful in assisting the exercises of discretion 
(inherent in the decision), and may  ‘ frame an administrative process for it 
to be reasonable and thus fair ’ . 116 In  Frankie ’ s , the FC stated that broad, 
fl exible adherence to guidelines set out in  Agraira has  ‘ many public benefi ts ’ , 
including  ‘ increased administrative effi ciency, reduced backlogs, decreased 
scope for arbitrariness and increased certainty and  predictability ’ . 117 Pub-
lished guidelines were held to  ‘ serve the useful role of giving rise to legitimate 
expectations regarding the assessment frameworks that will be followed by 
a public agency ’ , and can serve as a useful indicator of what constitutes a 
reasonable interpretation of legislation. 118 
 Summary of Principles of Legitimate Expectations in Canada 
 A claimant may have a legitimate expectation to a particular procedure, 119 
to have certain criteria considered as relevant, 120 or to a particular substan-
tive outcome. 121 However, one cannot have a legitimate expectation that 
certain criteria, not made express by pronouncements or conduct of the 
decision-maker, will not be considered. 122 
 Legitimate expectations are generated by a public body ’ s clear, unambigu-
ous and unqualifi ed conduct. 123 The conduct that can give rise to a legiti-
mate expectation includes established practices, actions, or representations 
(oral or written, specifi c or general) of the public authority, 124 or a closely 
related public authority whose guidelines are used in making the deci-
sion or guide the exercise of discretion. 125 Also, to give rise to a legitimate 
expectation, the conduct must be within the scope of the decision- maker ’ s 
statutory authority. 126 These are objective criteria. Finally, there is no 
requirement of awareness of, or detrimental reliance on, the conduct by the 
claimant. 127 
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 128  Old St Boniface (n 52);  CAP (n 58);  CUPE (n 91); and  Agraira (n 103). 
 129  Old St Boniface (n 52);  CAP (n 58);  CUPE (n 92); and  Agraira (n 103). 
 130  Baker (n 60). 
 131  Martineau (n 46). See also  Baker (n 60). 
 132  Baker (n 60); and  Agraira (n 103). 
 As an extension of the rules of procedural fairness, 128 legitimate expec-
tations may both extend procedural protections beyond what the circum-
stances may otherwise require, 129 and determine what procedures the duty 
of fairness requires in any circumstances. 130 The conduct of the administra-
tive decision-maker is useful to the courts as an indicator of fairness since it 
represents the expert administrator ’ s view of what constitutes fair procedure 
in the circumstances. 131 Legitimate expectations relate both to procedural 
and substantive accountability for decision-making, but result in only pro-
cedural remedies. 
 Although the SCC has stated that legitimate expectations only give rise 
to procedural protection, there is a range of substantive legal effects that 
fl ow from legitimate expectations. As part of the Court ’ s application of the 
proper standard of review, the analysis of reasonableness under administra-
tive law appears closely linked to its legitimate expectation reasoning. For 
example, in  Baker , the Court justifi ed its fi nding that the decision-maker 
had acted unreasonably in part because she failed to consider the applica-
ble guideline. In this way, while legitimate expectations have developed in 
Canada as a procedural doctrine, the doctrine ’ s analytic roots appear to be 
shared with substantive forms of review. 132 
 LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN THE TAX 
ADMINISTRATION CONTEXT 
 Having explored the sources of soft law in the Canadian tax administra-
tion context and the development of legitimate expectations in Canadian 
administrative law, we now return to explore what impact, if any, legiti-
mate expectations may have in arguably the richest setting of soft law in the 
Canadian legal system. 
 Courts ’ Current Treatment of CRA Soft Law 
 There are no SCC decisions that deal with the doctrine of legitimate expec-
tations in the tax administration context. We will however briefl y exam-
ine some Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) and Tax Court of Canada (TCC) 
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istration, it has held that CRA ’ s administrative guidelines are  ‘ not determinative but are entitled 
to weight and can be an  “ important factor ” in case of doubt about the meaning of legislation ’ : 
 Nowegijick v R [ 1983 ]  1 SCR 29 [28]. 
 134  Oberlander v Canada (AG)  2004  FCA 213 . 
 135  Johnston Canyon Co Ltd v Canada (AG)  2009  FCA 219 [32]. 
 136  See  Nowegijick (n 133). 
 137  See  Woon v MNR (n 39). The authors have not encountered any recent decisions in 
respect to such rulings, likely due to the CRA ’ s administrative practice. 
 138  Ludmer v Canada [ 1995 ]  2 FC 3 (FCA) ( ‘ Ludmer ’ ). 
 139  Ibid, citing  Admiral Investment Ltd v MNR [ 1967 ]  2 Ex CR 308 . 
 140  See  Ludmer (n 138). A limited amount of certainty is provided by the time limitations 
the  ITA places on the Minister ’ s power to assess, additionally assess, or reassess a taxpayer. 
decisions. 133 The FCA has consistently held that  ‘ policy guidelines do not 
create legitimate expectations of substantive rights ’ , 134 and has classifi ed 
taxpayers ’ request to have the Minister review the matter in accordance 
with CRA policies and publications as  ‘ a substantive right, in procedural 
language ’ . 135 CRA publications and materials have no legal force and are 
not determinative. 136 Taxpayers cannot rely on CRA publications and other 
administrative positions, and cannot rely on express promises or views 
expressed to another taxpayer in advance tax rulings (despite the CRA ’ s 
position and consistent practice of regarding such rulings as binding as 
between the CRA and that particular taxpayer). 137 
 This body of law, however, pre-dates the most recent developments in 
the legitimate expectations doctrine and soft law, particularly the Supreme 
Court ’ s decision in  Agraira . Older judicial statements about income taxa-
tion may also be vestiges of a time where taxation was viewed merely as 
confi scation of private property by the state — an attitude that, until quite 
recently, prompted the courts to interpret tax legislation narrowly and 
strictly as legislation designed to impose penalties. The assumptions and 
attitudes that underlie an approach holding tax law as  ‘ unique ’ warrant 
critical re-examination in light of the change in the role that income taxa-
tion plays in modern, welfare democracies. 
 Legitimate expectations in the tax setting are framed by a legal context 
in which each assessment of each individual ’ s tax liability in each year is 
considered afresh. In  Ludmer 138 the Federal Court confi rmed that a tax 
authority was not bound by a concession made in one year to have to make 
the same concession in other years even if there was no change in law. 139 
In other words, by applying the law to a person ’ s tax liability one way in 
one year, no legitimate expectation is created on which that person can rely 
to suggest that similar approaches are taken in the future. This is because 
the tax authority is authorised to assess each individual taxation year inde-
pendently, 140 making an assessment conclusive only for the year to which it 
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Management (Canada) Inc v Canada (National Revenue)  2012  FC 651 [76] (information bul-
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FCA in 72 DTC 6178 (FCA), subsequently affi rmed by SCC in 74 DTC 6269 (SCC); see also 
 MNR v Inland Industries [ 1971 ]  SCJ 145 . 
 148  Ludmer (n 138), citing  Vaillancourt (n 145) 674. See also  Harel v The Deputy Minister 
of Revenue in the Province of Quebec, [ 1978 ]  1 SCR 851 and  R v Nowegijick [ 1983 ]  SCJ o 5, 
83 DTC 5041 (SCC) . 
 149  Karia v Canada (MNR)  2005  FC 639 ( ‘ Karia ’ ).  Karia was never appealed but was fol-
lowed in  Wong v Canada (National Revenue)  2007  FC 628 . 
applies, and allowing the tax authority to take a different view in a different 
year. 141 So long as these inconsistent assessments are issued in good faith 
and are supported by the law, the courts will not interfere. 
 Aside from this case specifi c approach, the doctrine of legitimate expecta-
tions is treated the same way in tax administration as in the SCC decisions. 
Just as estoppel generally cannot lie with respect to an opinion or interpre-
tation of the law, 142 and cannot lie where it is invoked to prevent the exer-
cise of a statutory duty or the application of law, 143 legitimate expectations 
cannot compel a particular application of the  Income Tax Act . 144 Rather, 
guidelines issued by the CRA are held to refl ect government policy as to the 
meaning and scope of the legislation. 145 The Courts have viewed the inter-
pretation of the Act as their responsibility, and that government policy as 
refl ected in soft law cannot bind that interpretive role. 146 On this basis, the 
FCA has stated that the Minister is not bound in the present or the future by 
CRA ’ s guidelines. 147 However, a taxpayer may use the CRA ’ s guidelines to 
support an argument that the interpretation in the guidelines is correct. 148 In 
this sense, soft law in this context has legal relevance, even if not enforceable 
per se. Can soft law by itself ground an argument of unreasonableness or 
unfairness ? The short answer in Canada now appears to be affi rmative on 
both fronts. That said, the circumstances in which guidelines or other forms 
of soft law play a role in legal consequences remains to be fully explored. 
 For example, in the voluntary disclosure programme, which uses the dis-
cretion of the Minister to waive interest and penalties, several cases have 
held the Minister to the conditions for and the substantive relief promised in 
the applicable Information Circular. In  Karia, 149 the FC held that although 
Information Circulars are not delegated legislation and have no force of law 
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 1 SCR 851 . 
 157  Brelco Drilling Ltd v The Queen  98  DTC 1422 (TCC) 430 . 
 158  Wollenberg (n 154). This is linked to the doctrine of fettering of discretion by an admin-
istrative decision-maker. 
 ‘ as such ’ , promissory estoppel would operate to prevent the Minister with 
the necessary lawful authority from exercising discretion contrary to the 
promise contained in the Information Circular. 150 Where the requirements 
for estoppel have not been met, the FC has held that Information Circulars 
are not binding on the Minister in the exercise of discretion. 151 Further, 
guidelines have been held to be relevant in assessing the reasonableness of 
the Minister ’ s decision when exercising discretionary powers. 152 Whatever 
the role of guidelines in setting out relevant considerations the weight to be 
assigned to the relevant and competing factors, within a range of reasonable 
outcomes, is for the decision-maker alone. 153 
 The TCC held in  Wollenberg , in reference to the provisions that set a 
taxpayer ’ s liability rather than those which deal with tax administration, 
that: 
 what Parliament has decreed shall be the rules applicable in determining what is 
payable by way of tax under the provisions of the Act is paramount and cannot be 
repealed or amended in any manner by whatever Revenue Canada may choose to 
publish by way of Tax Guides, Interpretation Bulletins, or otherwise. 154 
 In the context of the substantive tax provisions, such publications have some 
limited legal consequences. 155 Where a provision is ambiguous, such that 
there is doubt as to its meaning, guidelines are  ‘ entitled to weight ’ and can 
be an  ‘ important factor ’ in the process of proper interpretation. 156 However, 
courts have refused to simply rely on administrative practice when provi-
sions are unclear. 157 Where a policy contradicts the wording of the provision 
or otherwise takes a position not supported by the legislation, it can be of no 
help. 158 Administrative practice has an asymmetrical operation which can 
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Reference Materials include the  Taxpayer Relief Reference Guide which is intended to be a 
 ‘ complete and up-to-date guidelines on how to apply the taxpayer relief provisions ’ and  ‘ easy-
to-use reference that has information you need to process taxpayer requests ’ . 
be used to resolve doubt in favour of the taxpayer, but not in favour of the 
administrative decision-maker that formulated the guideline. 159 
 CRA Guidelines and the  Agraira Criteria 
 In  Agraira , the SCC held that in order for guidelines to be able to give rise 
to legitimate expectations, the guidelines must be: 
(1)  publicly available; 
(2)  used to make a decision or guide an exercise of discretion; and 
(3)  a  ‘ relatively ’ comprehensive code with respect to making that decision 
or exercising that discretion. 
 Of the six CRA guidelines described in the fi rst part of this chapter, which 
would meet all three conditions ? 
 The fi rst criterion is that the guidelines be publicly available, but the 
Court did not say that the agency that created the guidelines must make 
them publicly available, that they must have been intended for the public, 
or that they be available to the person seeking to rely on them. All six CRA 
guidelines are publicly available: Folios, ITs, ICs, ITTN, and Tax Guides 
and Pamphlets are all made available to and are intended to be consulted 
by the public. ATRs, however, are not publicly available, though members 
of the public may access them through access to Information legislation. 160 
If ATRs are publicly available for the purposes of the  Agraira analysis, then 
almost all government guidelines would qualify provided that someone has 
at some point requested and been granted access to them. 
 The second criterion is that the guidelines are used by the decision-maker 
in making a decision or for the purpose of guiding an exercise of discretion. 
This criterion appears to be more challenging in respect to the six guide-
lines discussed. On the surface, none of the six are expressly stated to be 
used to guide decisions or exercises of discretion, since the staff manuals 
are expected to be used by CRA decision-makers. 161 However, when look-
ing at the content of the internal staff manuals and comparing them to the 
guidelines considered in this chapter, the substantive content of the two are 
for all intents and purposes identical. Also, quite often, the manuals refer 
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 162  All Folios refer to ITs and ITTNs that they replace, so it can reasonably be assumed that 
where a reference is to an IT or ITTN that has been replaced by a Folio, the CRA employee 
will look to the Folio for guidance. 
the CRA employee to outside sources, including: ICs; Guidelines and Pam-
phlets; ITs; ATRs; and ITTN. The only type of guideline referred to in this 
chapter that is not mentioned in the CRA employee manuals are the Folios, 
likely because they are too recent to have been incorporated explicitly into 
the manuals. 162 Therefore, all six guidelines would likely meet this criterion, 
given their incorporation into the employee manuals used by CRA employ-
ees in making decisions or exercising discretion. 
 The third criterion, that the guideline be a relatively comprehensive code 
with respect to that decision or that exercise of discretion, will likely be sat-
isfi ed given that each of the six guidelines, at least with respect to the mat-
ters they do address within the topics they are geared towards, is relatively 
complete. This analysis must, however, be made on a guideline-by-guideline 
basis. 
 In light of the  Agraira criteria and the context of CRA soft law, lower 
court rulings suggesting there is no legal obligation on CRA offi cials to con-
sider guidelines is now suspect. Indeed, it may well be that areas of law with 
dense and long-standing uses of soft law, like tax administration, will lead 
Canada ’ s doctrine of legitimate expectations in new directions. 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 This chapter has canvassed the evolution of the Canadian legitimate expec-
tations doctrine with specifi c reference to soft law in the income tax context. 
We have used a representative sample of soft law instruments to show how 
the criteria developed by the Supreme Court of Canada might alter the way 
in which those guidelines are understood from the perspective of legitimate 
expectations. Where once these instruments were seen as not giving rise to 
procedural or substantive rights to have guidelines considered or followed, 
there now appears to be good reason to rethink the legal implications of soft 
law. In this way, we have attempted to grapple both with the legal principles 
explored by Canadian courts and the administrative realities in which those 
principles must resonate. 
 The development of legitimate expectations cannot be isolated from a 
broader trend moving towards a greater  ‘ ethos of justifi cation ’ in the admin-
istrative state and administrative justice. Chief Justice McLachlin described 
this trend in the following terms: 
 [S]ocieties governed by the Rule of Law are marked by a certain ethos of justifi ca-
tion. In a democratic society, this may well be the general characteristic of the Rule 
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of Law within which the more specifi c ideals  … are subsumed  … .Where a society 
is marked by a culture of justifi cation, an exercise of public power is only appro-
priate where it can be justifi ed to citizens in terms of rationality and fairness  … 
The Rule of Law, in short, can speak in several voices so long as the resulting cho-
rus echoes its underlying values of rationality and fairness (emphasis added). 163 
 An  ‘ ethos of justifi cation ’ includes the idea that  ‘ arbitrary state action 
[is] impermissible ’ such that  ‘ the exercise of power must be [ … ] justifi -
able and justifi ed ’ so that citizens see, 164 through the fog of government 
action, the  ‘ underlying values of rationality and fairness ’ . 165 In Canadian 
administrative law, procedural fairness, substantive review for reasona-
bleness or correctness (depending on the standard of review), and moni-
toring of jurisdiction together serve to advance and promote a culture of 
justifi cation. 166 
 The intersection of soft law and legitimate expectations can advance 
the project of justifi cation in several ways. Specifi cally, by recognising that 
soft law can give rise to legitimate expectations, the Supreme Court has 
opened up new avenues for enhancing the transparency and accountability 
of administrative action. At least in the circumstances confi rmed in  Agraira 
(but perhaps more broadly), guidelines of the kind discussed in this chapter 
in relation to tax administration can give rise to enforceable expectations. 
Soft law and legitimate expectations provide a framework for ensuring 
greater consistency and coherence in the exercise of discretion — and where 
it can be justifi ed, also ensure transparency if and when administrative deci-
sion-makers depart from guidelines and other policy instruments. 
 Legitimate expectations invite greater attentiveness to context in the 
review of administrative action. Administrative bodies come in all manner 
of confi gurations of powers, duties, obligations, purposes and roles. They 
combine, in various ways, administrative, investigatory, and judicial roles in 
pursuit of effi cient, effective, and even-handed implementation of govern-
ment goals. Given this variety, courts should consider a number of factors 
when considering the legal effect to be given to soft law instruments. While 
it is premature to describe exhaustively the scope and nature of these fac-
tors, the goal of advancing the  ‘ ethos of justifi cation ’ suggests at least some 
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of these considerations. For example, where the legislation applies to the 
general public, a vulnerable sub-group of the public, where it applies irre-
spective of deliberate action by the person, where the statute is complex or 
voluminous, where the words conferring the discretionary power are gen-
eral or broad, where the nature of the discretion is punitive or relieving, 
and where the consequences of mistakes can have signifi cant effects on the 
person ’ s daily life, soft law instruments are more likely to be useful, con-
sulted, and relied on. They ought therefore to be given greater considera-
tion by courts when the guideline supports or favours the private person ’ s 
position or interest. Further, where the instrument sets out a procedure to 
be followed and the conditions under which discretionary power will be 
exercised, guidelines ought to be given greater weight. 
 While the potential of legitimate expectations in relation to soft law is sig-
nifi cant, as demonstrated by the setting of tax administration, considerable 
uncertainty remains. The sharp distinction drawn in Canadian administra-
tive law between the procedural and substantive implications of legitimate 
expectations is diffi cult to sustain. The analysis of relevant factors in the 
legitimate expectations analysis in the context of soft law remains largely 
undeveloped. In our view, the importance and variability of soft law in the 
administrative state will continue to drive the development of legitimate 
expectations. Canadian administrative law is poised to develop a more 
coherent and transparent doctrine of legitimate expectations. At the same 
time, a richer understanding of legitimate expectations can serve as a vital 
catalyst for sorting out the place of soft law within broader rule of law 
commitments. 
 
 

